Author profile

Alastair Smith

Alastair Smith is an NYU political scientist who writes about political survival, institutions, elections and the incentives shaping leaders’ decisions.

1 published book 0 published articles

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About Alastair Smith

Alastair Smith is the Bernhardt Denmark Chair of International Relations and a professor of politics at New York University. He studied chemistry at the University of Oxford before earning a PhD in political science from the University of Rochester. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2013.

Smith writes political science for both academic and general audiences. His recurring subject is political survival: how leaders choose policies, distribute resources and manage supporters in order to remain in office. His work spans international relations, comparative politics and political economy, often combining formal models with historical cases and cross-national evidence.

With Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, he coauthored The Logic of Political Survival, an extensive presentation of selectorate theory. His other books include Election Timing and, with Fiona McGillivray, Punishing the Prince. Smith received the International Studies Association’s Karl Deutsch Award in 2005.

The best starting point is The Dictator’s Handbook, written with Bueno de Mesquita. It recasts the pair’s ideas for a broad readership, arguing that dictators and democrats alike must retain a decisive group of supporters. From there, readers wanting the fuller scholarly framework can turn to The Logic of Political Survival.

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The Dictator's Handbook

The Dictator’s Handbook presents politics as a problem of survival rather than a contest between noble principles. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith argue that every leader—from an autocrat supported by a few generals to an elected president dependent on millions of voters—must maintain a coalition capable of keeping that leader in office. The size and replaceability of this coalition shape how rulers raise money, distribute benefits, tolerate corruption, provide public services, wage war, handle foreign aid, and respond to popular unrest. Small coalitions encourage private rewards for loyal insiders; large coalitions make broadly shared benefits more politically useful. Drawing examples from governments, municipalities, corporations, monarchies, and other organizations, the authors turn selectorate theory into an accessible framework for comparative politics. Their account is deliberately unsentimental: harmful conduct can be politically rational even when it is disastrous f…

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