Co-author
The Dictator's Handbook
The Dictator’s Handbook presents politics as a problem of survival rather than a contest between noble principles. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith argue that every leader—from an autocrat supported by a few generals to an elected president dependent on millions of voters—must maintain a coalition capable of keeping that leader in office. The size and replaceability of this coalition shape how rulers raise money, distribute benefits, tolerate corruption, provide public services, wage war, handle foreign aid, and respond to popular unrest. Small coalitions encourage private rewards for loyal insiders; large coalitions make broadly shared benefits more politically useful. Drawing examples from governments, municipalities, corporations, monarchies, and other organizations, the authors turn selectorate theory into an accessible framework for comparative politics. Their account is deliberately unsentimental: harmful conduct can be politically rational even when it is disastrous f…