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Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

American political scientist and nonfiction author known for using game theory to explain political survival, conflict and the incentives that shape governments.

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About Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is an American political scientist and the Julius Silver Professor of Politics at New York University. His research applies game theory to international conflict, negotiation, political institutions and economic development. He has also served as president of the International Studies Association and as a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

His nonfiction treats politics as a system of incentives rather than a contest between noble intentions and personal failings. Working alone and with fellow political scientist Alastair Smith, he asks what leaders must do to gain power, reward indispensable supporters and remain in office. The method is analytical and often deliberately unsentimental, drawing examples from democracies and autocracies alike.

His books include The Predictioneer’s Game, about forecasting political outcomes; The Invention of Power, an argument about church-state competition and Western development; and The Spoils of War, co-written with Smith, on American presidents’ political incentives during wartime. His academic work helped develop selectorate theory, which studies how the size of a leader’s essential supporting coalition affects policy and political survival.

Start with The Dictator’s Handbook. It is the clearest entry into the central argument of his work: every ruler depends on a coalition, and the size of that coalition shapes taxation, public goods, corruption and repression. Its cases range from ancient Rome and Tammany Hall to modern states, turning formal political theory into a brisk work of explanatory nonfiction.

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The Dictator's Handbook

The Dictator’s Handbook presents politics as a problem of survival rather than a contest between noble principles. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith argue that every leader—from an autocrat supported by a few generals to an elected president dependent on millions of voters—must maintain a coalition capable of keeping that leader in office. The size and replaceability of this coalition shape how rulers raise money, distribute benefits, tolerate corruption, provide public services, wage war, handle foreign aid, and respond to popular unrest. Small coalitions encourage private rewards for loyal insiders; large coalitions make broadly shared benefits more politically useful. Drawing examples from governments, municipalities, corporations, monarchies, and other organizations, the authors turn selectorate theory into an accessible framework for comparative politics. Their account is deliberately unsentimental: harmful conduct can be politically rational even when it is disastrous f…

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